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Abstract
Adblocking tools continue to rise in popularity, alter-
ing the dynamics of advertising revenue streams. In
response, a number of publishers have ramped up ef-
forts to develop and deploy tools for detecting and/or
counter-blocking adblockers (tools we refer to as anti-
adblockers), effectively escalating the online advertising
arms race. In this paper, we leverage a novel approach
for identifying third-party services shared across multi-
ple websites to present a first characterization of anti-
adblocking across the Alexa Top-5K websites. We map
websites that perform anti-adblocking as well as the en-
tities that provide anti-adblocking scripts. We study the
modus operandi of these scripts and their impact on pop-
ular adblockers. We find that at least 6.7% of websites in
the Alexa Top-5K use anti-adblocking scripts, acquired
from 12 distinct entities – some of which have a direct
interest in nourishing the online advertising industry.
1 Introduction
Today’s web ecosystem is largely driven by online ad-
vertising. However, recent years have seen a large num-
ber of users turn to adblocking and tracker-blocking
tools1 [13] for the purposes of improving their web-
browsing experience, maintaining privacy, and more re-
1While adblocking differs from tracker-blocking, to ease presentation,
we refer to tools that provide any of these properties as adblockers.
cently to protect themselves against malvertising [16].
With a recent study estimating the number of active ad-
block users to be 198M and revenue losses due to ad-
blockers at $22B [14], the threat posed by adblockers to
the online advertising revenue model has moved from
mildly concerning to existential. In response, publishers
have started to actively detect users of adblockers, and
subsequently block them or otherwise coerce them to
disable the adblocker– in the rest of the paper, we refer
to this practice as anti-adblocking. Most recently, this
practice gained wide attention with the endorsement of
the Internet Advertising Bureau (IAB) when, in March
2016, it released a primer on how to deal with users of
adblockers, as well as semi open-source script2 for de-
tecting the use of adblockers [10]. The tension between
key stakeholders in this ecosystem – publishers, users,
and a plethora of intermediate beneficiaries (whether
categorised as ad-tech, adblocking, anti-adblocking or
micropayment) – forms part of what has been dubbed as
the adblocking arms race [17].
Motivation. While incidents of anti-adblocking [2, 5,
15,17], and the legality of such practices [3,12,19], have
received increasing attention, our current understanding
is limited to online forums [2] and user-generated re-
ports [5]. As a result, we lack quantifiable insights into
key questions such as: how prevalent nowadays are such
practices on the Web? Are certain categories of web-
sites more likely to employ anti-adblockers? Who are
2The script was only made available to members of the IAB.
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the main suppliers of anti-adblocking services? What
mechanisms do these employ to detect the presence of
adblockers? Is it possible for adblockers to counter-
block anti-adblockers? What are common responses af-
ter positive detection of adblockers and their impact on
end-user? In this work, we address these questions by
presenting the first characterization of anti-adblocking.
Roadmap. We start with characterizing anti-adblocking
on the Web by identifying anti-adblocking scripts across
Alexa Top-5K sites. To this end, we develop a scalable
novel technique to identify popular third-party services
that are shared across multiple websites, and utilize it
to flag anti-adblocking scripts. We then map out the
entities that serve anti-adblocking scripts and the web-
sites that use these scripts. We find that at least 6.7%
of Alexa Top-5K websites conduct some form of anti-
adblocking by downloading 14 scripts from 12 unique
domains most of which belong to ad services, while
one specifically offers anti-adblocking services. Most
of the anti-adblocking websites represent popular cat-
egories such as news, blogs, and entertainment. We
manually visit sample websites from the anti-adblockers
and find that the arms race has already entered the next
round: at least one of three popular browser extensions
(AdBlock Plus, Ghostery, Privacy Badger) can counter-
block half of the anti-adblocking scripts. We conclude
with a discussion of the anti-adblocking arms race in
terms of ethics and legality, also enumerating existing
proposals that aim to achieve a sustainable and unintru-
sive online advertising model.
2 Methodology
This section presents our method for identifying third-
party services that are shared between multiple websites.
We describe the technique in the context of identifying
shared anti-adblocking JavaScripts (JS). The premise of
our approach is that by discovering similar objects (in
our case, JavaScripts) that are loaded by multiple web-
sites, we can infer the presence of a common third-party
JS, its functionality and its source.
Crawler overview. We rely on Crawler Incanta-
tus, a Selenium-based interactive crawler used by the
ICLab [8], to generate the set of JavaScripts to analyze.
We load each website in our dataset with four browser
modes – vanilla Firefox, Firefox with AbBlock Plus,
Firefox with Ghostery, and Firefox with Privacy Bad-
ger. For each page load, we capture screenshots, HTML
source code, and responses to all requests generated by
the browser. We extract all the text between <script>
and </script> from the HTML and tag them as em-
bedded JS. Similarly, we detect all JS objects in the col-
lected responses and tag them as downloaded JS. In to-
tal, the Top-5K Alexa websites generate over 200K in-
dividual JS files.
Identifying JS objects with common sources. We for-
mulate our problem of finding groups of similar JS as a
maximal clique finding problem [4]. We consider each
JS file loaded by a website to be a node in a graph. If
two nodes are within some margin of similarity of each
other (we define our similarity metric below), we say
there is an edge between them. We extract classes of JS
that have a common source by identifying all maximal
cliques in this graph. By intentionally focusing on find-
ing similar JS (rather than identical JS) we allow for the
grouping of objects that differ only slightly because they
contain website-specific identifiers and properties.
Choice of similarity metric and threshold. In order
to add an edge between two nodes in the graph (i.e., to
indicate that two JS files are similar), we need to de-
fine a metric for similarity, and a suitable threshold for
this metric. To measure the similarity of two JS files,
we use Term Frequency–Inverse Document Frequency
(TF-IDF) to generate a vector of keyword weights for
each JS file after filtering out JS reserved words, such as
function and var. We then use the cosine similar-
ity metric to measure the similarity of the two keyword
weight vectors. Similar approaches using both TF-IDF
and cosine similarity have been used by the information
retrieval community for topic identification and similar-
ity checking of source-code [9, 20]. We note that this
method is particularly well suited to our task compared
to other string matching approaches because it is:
• White-space insensitive: Many websites perform
script minification using different libraries, yielding
different indentation and white-spacing practices.
Our approach is unaffected by these complications.
• Position insensitive: In scripts that have several
functionalities (e.g., tracking and ad-block detec-
tion), the position of each specific function is irrele-
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Figure 1: Effect of the similarity threshold parameter on the
True Positive Rate (TPR) and the number of maximal cliques.
vant to the similarity score.
• Reasonably resistant to noise: Small changes (e.g.,
website specific identifiers) have little impact on the
final similarity score.
In order to determine a similarity score threshold,
we perform a series of clique extraction experiments
on a small dataset of 4.4K JS files extracted from the
Alexa Top-100 websites. We find, via manual inspec-
tion, that at a threshold of 0.80, 17/20 cliques returned
by our program contain scripts with identical functional-
ity and sources, i.e., achieving True Positive Rate (TPR)
of 0.85. In Figure 1, we illustrate the change in TPR
along with the number of cliques returned as the thresh-
old increases. Although thresholds above 0.90 yield
TPR=1.0, the number of cliques returned drops signif-
icantly, which will result in lower True Negative Rates
(TNR). Therefore, following a conservative stance, we
use a threshold of 0.80 for the remainder of our experi-
ments.
Improving scalability. Our approach involves comput-
ing the cosine similarity between each pair of keyword
weight vectors, thus requiring O(n2) vector multiplica-
tions for n JS files. Given the large number of JS files
used by websites (e.g., the Alexa Top-5K sites contained
over 200K JavaScripts), this may not scale with large
datasets. Therefore, we use a set of heuristically de-
veloped filters to eliminate comparisons between scripts
that are unlikely to ever be part of the same clique:
• Word-count filter: We avoid comparing scripts with
significant word-count difference. Specifically, if a
pair of scripts has a word-count ratio higher than
1.50, we assume that they are unlikely to be a part
of the same clique and set their similarity to 0.
• Embedded vs. downloaded script filter: JavaScript
is either embedded in the source HTML for page-
specific functionality, or downloaded separately
from external sources to provide site-wide function-
ality. We do not consider them as the same type of
identity thus we set their similarity to 0.
• Source filter: If two JavaScripts are downloaded
from the exact same URL, we mark them as iden-
tical.
• JS domain filter: JavaScript can communicate with
external sources indicated by embedded URLs. We
assume that for any pair of scripts, if one communi-
cates with external sources and the other does not,
their functionality is different and set their similarity
score to 0.
Source and functionality identification. Once maxi-
mal cliques of similar scripts are identified, the content
and meta-data of each script in a clique is used to gen-
erate and log: (i) the FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain
Name) of the script’s source, (ii) FQDNs of external re-
sources utilized by the script, and (iii) keywords asso-
ciated with the script. In Section 3, we use these three
features, in addition to content of the script, to classify
cliques by functionality.
Method limitations. We acknowledge that our method
has a number of limitations: Notably, our similarity met-
ric will fail to identify obfuscated JS code. Further-
more, given that we do not compare downloaded with
embedded JS code, we may fail to identify small cliques
in which a reduced number of sites integrate an anti-
adblocking JS in a different way than is normal. Ad-
ditionally, our method may fail to identify similarities
between composed JS– i.e., scripts that consist of multi-
ple individual files downloaded as a single object. As a
result, our method only provides a lower-bound approx-
imation of the usage of anti-adblocking across websites.
We plan on addressing these limitations in future work.
3 Dataset and Results
We apply our clique detection methodology to the JS
objects fetched by our crawler. We restrict our analysis
to cliques of size greater than 5 – i.e., JavaScripts shared
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Downloaded Embedded
Cliques 1373 509
Websites 3619 2070
Total websites: 4017
Trackers Anti-Adblockers
Cliques 456 22
Websites 2741 335
Table 1: The number of total cliques and those related
to tracking and anti-adblocking, along with the number of
websites that incorporate these scripts (computed over 200K
downloaded and embedded scripts).
by more than 5 sites in our dataset – as we are inter-
ested in identifying scripts that are shared across multi-
ple websites. We acknowledge that this approach might
fail to flag anti-adblocking scripts utilized by individ-
ual or a small number of websites, and those used by a
few websites in the Alexa Top-5K but popular among
websites ranked above 5K. As shown in Table 1, we
find 1,373 cliques that are shared among 3,619 websites
in the downloaded files, with an average of 232 web-
sites per clique (σ=365.6) and the largest clique having
1,320 websites (which we find, via manual inspection,
is a JS related to user interface). Among the embed-
ded scripts, 509 cliques are shared by 2,070 websites
(µ=41.2 σ=48.9 max=261). We manually analyze all the
1,882 cliques (corresponding to 4,017 unique websites)
identified for both downloaded and embedded scripts,
and tag them as trackers (if they upload information
such as IP addresses and cookies to tracking compa-
nies), anti-adblockers (if they check for the presence of
adblockers), or others. We note that manual analysis of
JS is a tedious process and does not scale to a large num-
ber of scripts. In future work, we plan on looking into
ways to automate JS tagging.
We uncover 22 cliques used for anti-adblocking em-
ployed by 335 websites – about 6.7% of Alexa Top-
5K websites. We observe that Alexa Top-1K have
60 anti-adblocking websites, and the number increases
by about 70 websites for every additional 1K consid-
ered, reaching 335 anti-adblocking websites in Top-5K.
While studying anti-adblockers, we also identify 456
tracking cliques employed by about 54% of Alexa Top-
5K, validating previous studies on the pervasiveness of
tracking over the Web [6].
19.5% General News 2.5% Pornography
9.3% Blogs/Wiki 2.5% Forum/Bulletin Boards
8.5% Entertainment 2.2% Technical/Business Forums
4.3% Internet Services 2.2% Potential Illegal Software
3.7% Sports 2.0% Online Shopping
3.7% Games 1.7% Portal Sites
3.2% Travel 1.7% Humor/Comics
3.2% Education/Reference 1.2% Social Networking
2.7% Business 1.2% Provocative Attire
2.5% Software/Hardware 1.2% Marketing/Merchandising
Table 2: Distribution of anti-adblocking websites by category
according to McAfee’s URL categorization.
Anti-adblocking by website categories. In Table 2, we
report the categories of the 335 anti-adblocking web-
sites, using McAfee’s URL categorization service [11].
We find that anti-adblocking is common among a di-
verse mix of publishers, and prevalent among publish-
ers of “General News” (19.5%), “Blogs/Wiki” (9.3%),
and “Entertainment” (8.5%) categories, which represent
more than one third of all websites. Note that these cat-
egories are also among the most popular ones across
all Top-5K Alexa domains, although to a lesser extent
– respectively, 9.4%, 6.29%, and 5.4%. Whereas, other
popular categories among Top-5K domains (e.g., “In-
ternet services”, “Online Shopping”, “Business”, which
account for 20% of the Top-5K) are much less prevalent
in anti-adblocking websites.
Website response to detection of adblockers. In or-
der to assess how anti-adblocking websites behave once
they identify adblockers, we look at all the screenshots
taken by our crawler, respectively, without any adblock-
ing extension and with AdBlock Plus (which we assume
is more likely to be detected due to its popularity [13]).
We note cases where there is an explicit (i.e., warning
to disable adblocker) or a discrete (i.e., blank page via
AdBlock Plus, but normal appearance without) response
to adblocking. For these websites, we also view screen-
shots when accessed with Ghostery, Privacy Badger, and
NoScript enabled.
We find only 6 explicit and no discrete responses
to adblocking. Of the explicit responses, 3 are dis-
played by porn websites hosted by the same company
– MindGeek – and employ the same anti-adblocking
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script downloaded from DoublePimp. The warning
is displayed for both AdBlock Plus and Ghostery. The
remaining 3 also employ the same script, but display dif-
ferent messages (only for AdBlock Plus) with the same
general theme, i.e., nudging the user to disable the ad-
blocker and/or support the website via subscription or
donation.
Some websites display adblocker warning to users af-
ter they engage in some form of activity, such as clicking
on links or scrolling. To capture such responses, we re-
peat the above exercise for screenshots taken after mim-
icking user activity – specifically, clicking on a random
link on the page, scrolling down to the bottom of the
newly loaded page, waiting three seconds, then scrolling
back up to the top of the page, waiting 5 seconds. While
the modified methodology validates our previous obser-
vations, we do not discover any new responses.
In the attempt of automating the analysis of websites’
response to anti-adblocking, we have also tried to use
image comparison tools, such as perceptual hashing.
However, this generates a high number of false positives
due to dynamic content on many sites as well as false
negatives since anti-adblocking warnings and messages
generate a relatively small visual difference.
How anti-adblockers work. Next, we manually in-
spect the 22 anti-adblocking scripts (14 downloaded and
8 embedded) aiming to understand how anti-adblocking
scripts detect adblockers. We note that of these only
the 14 downloaded scripts are actually useful as the
8 embedded scripts simply redirect to the downloaded
scripts. We find that anti-adblockers operate on a simple
premise: if an expected advertisement-related element
on the publisher’s website is missing when the page
loads, the script concludes that the user has an adblocker
installed.
Specifically, the anti-adblocker detects adblockers
by injecting a dummy advertisement container element
(e.g., DIV), and then comparing the values of properties
representing dimensions (height and width) and/or
visual status (display) of the container element with
the expected values when properly loaded. To track
whether the user has turned off the adblocker after being
prompted to do so, the anti-adblocker periodically runs
the ad-block check and stores the last recorded status in
the user’s browser using a cookie or local storage.
Domain Description #Sites ABP Gh PB
pagefair.com Anti-adblocking 20 3 7 3
googleadservices.com Ads 61 7 7 7
googlesyndication.com Ads 13 7 7 7
taboola.com Ads 36 7 3 3
outbrain.com Ads 10 7 3 3
ensighten.com Ads 6 7 3 7
hotjar.com Analytics 9 7 7 7
doublepimp.com Pornography 8 7 3 7
tacdn.com Travel 8 7 7 7
cloudflare.com CDN 50 7 7 3
cloudfront.net CDN 6 7 7 7
ytimg.com Content/Ads 108 7 7 7
Table 3: Domains from which anti-adblocking scripts are
downloaded and #websites employing them. The table’s right
side reports whether AdBlock Plus, Ghostery, and Privacy
Badger counter-block anti-adblocking scripts from these do-
mains.
Anti-adblocker suppliers. We analyze the source
code of the 14 anti-adblocking scripts and the domains
from which these are downloaded aiming to infer the
suppliers of these scripts. The remaining 8 embed-
ded scripts redirect to anti-adblocking scripts served by
Cloudflare and Taboola. Our analysis is summa-
rized in Table 3. We also include a description of these
domains – based on the information available on their
official websites, Google search, and Mcafee URL cate-
gorization service [11] – as well as the number of web-
sites in our dataset that employ the anti-adblocker.
At the top we find Pagefair, a company special-
ized in anti-adblocking services, followed by a number
of domains related to Google, Taboola, Outbrain
and Ensighten. Overall the anti-adblockers down-
loaded from these 5 domains are employed by 48% of
all the 315 websites employing anti-adblockers. We
note that these domains are direct beneficiaries of anti-
adblocking as these inherently thrive on the prevalence
of online advertisements. Though not directly related to
online advertisement, the ability to detect adblockers is
a useful capability for the analytics company HotJar.
We also find two cases where the anti-adblocking
script is shared by entities in the same domain or busi-
ness: TripAdvisor (tacdn.com) distributes the script
to its 8 websites with different country code top-level
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domains. Adult websites, all of which are hosted by
MindGeek, turn to DoublePimp for anti-adblocking.
Two anti-adblocking scripts are pulled from popular
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), but we could not
determine their original supplier. Finally, ytimg (a
content server associated with YouTube) serves a script
that has the ability to detect if ads were properly loaded,
however, it is not clear how it uses this information.
Adblocker response to being blocked. There is anec-
dotal evidence that the adblocking arms race has en-
tered the next level: some adblockers can detect anti-
adblockers and counter-block them [18]. To test for
this behaviour, we visit a sample website for each anti-
adblocking script via AdBlock Plus, Ghostery and Pri-
vacy Badger over Chrome web browser. We repeat the
experiment three times and monitor all HTTP requests
generated when loading the website using Chrome’s De-
veloper Tools. We infer that adblocker can counter-
block if the request to fetch anti-adblocking script fails
to be initiated. As reported in Table 3, half of the
12 anti-adblocking suppliers are blocked by at least
one adblocker. Ghostery and Privacy Badger detect 4
anti-adblockers each, while AdBlock Plus detects only
1. Anti-adblocking scripts served by Taboola and
Outbrain are blocked by both Ghostery and Privacy
Badger, PageFair scripts by both AdBlock Plus and
Privacy Badger, while Doublepimp, Ensighten
and Cloudflare scripts by at most one of the three
adblockers. We note that the anti-adblocking suppliers
that are never detected are related to content distribution,
Google ad services, analytics, or site-wide scripts.
4 Discussion
The adblocking arms race involves a plethora of play-
ers: between publishers and consumers, a jostling array
of intermediaries compete to deliver ads, mostly sup-
ported by business models that involve taking a cut of
the resultant advertising revenue. At the heart of this
rich ecosystem lie important questions regarding the le-
gality and ethics of adblocking and anti-adblocking.
The legality of adblocking is potentially contestable
under laws about anti-competitive business conduct and
copyright infringement. To date, only Germany has
tested these arguments in court, with adblockers win-
ning most [3], but not all of the cases [12]. On the other
hand, anti-adblocking in the EU might in turn breach
Article 5(3) of the Privacy and Electronic Communica-
tions Directive 2002/58/EC, as it involves interrogating
an end-user’s terminal equipment without consent [19].
Many consider adblocking to be an ethical choice for
consumers and publishers to consider from both an in-
dividual and societal perspective. In reality, however,
both sides have resorted to radical measures to achieve
their goals. The Web has empowered publishers and
advertisers to track, profile and target users in a way
that is unprecedented in the physical realm [6]. In addi-
tion, publishers are inadvertantly and increasingly serv-
ing up malicious ads (malvertisements) [16]. This has
resulted in the rise of adblocking, which in turn has led
publishers to employ anti-adblocking. The core issue
is to get the balance right between ads and informa-
tion. Publishers turn to anti-adblocking to force con-
sumers to reconsider the default blocking of ads for
earnest ad-supported publishers. Defaults are very dif-
ficult to shift at scale. Nevertheless, those publishers
will fail if they do not redress in a fundamental way
the reasons that brought consumers to adblockers in the
first place. There exist proposals to provide a compro-
mise, such as privacy-friendly advertising [7] as well
as mechanisms to give users more control over ads and
trackers they are exposed to [1, 21]. Our work extends
these efforts by providing quantified insights into anti-
adblocking, to inform policy that improves upon the cur-
rent blocking/counter-blocking deadlock.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a measurement-based anal-
ysis providing a first look at anti-adblocking in the on-
line advertising arms race. We found that at least 6.7%
of Alexa Top-5K websites, mostly in popular categories
like news, blogs, and entertainment, engage in some
form of anti-adblocking. The arms race has already
entered the next level, as at least one of three popular
browser extensions – AdBlock Plus, Ghostery, Privacy
Badger – can evade half of the anti-adblocking scripts
in our dataset. In future work, we plan to extend our
measurements beyond the Alexa Top-5K websites, and
experiment with crowdsourced and/or automated mech-
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anisms to tag JavaScript by functionality and to assess
publisher response to detection of adblockers.
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